In the world of Philosophy for Children, the word “method” is found frequently in its literature and in its practitioner’s handbooks. This paper focuses on the idea of community of philosophical inquiry as P4C’s methodological framework for educational purposes, and evaluates that framework and those purposes in light of the question, what does it mean to bring children and philosophy together, and what methodological framework, if any, is appropriate to that project? Our broader aim is to highlight a problem with (...) regards to the concept of method in P4C, and to question the consequences of that concept in the practice of philosophical dialogue with children. To better situate the concept of method within P4C, we will identify two different historical understandings—represented by Rene Descartes and Hans Georg Gadamer—of the concept, and suggest new possibilities for understanding philosophical practice with children in light of their difference. (shrink)

The paper arises from a shared event that turned into an experience: the finding of a childlike piece of paper on our way to a conference about philosophy in schools and how it affects our educational ideas and research practices on listening to children. Triggered by the question of what it means to listen, we are led to the exercise of self-questioning inspired by some of the authors that have already written about the topic, specifically in the context of the (...) community of philosophical enquiry. The thinking unfolds with the telling of the story about the found piece of paper, crossing different layers of questioning and trying to keep the enquiry open for the readers: what is it that we do not know about listening to children? And to what extent might that, which we do not know, be the cause of biased and adultist practices? Is it necessary to return to what philosophy is and where one can find it inside the school environment? Is it already there when the adults arrive? Are we not listening to it? Or are there specific places for philosophical conversations, such as the classroom? Is philosophy also invited to the margins of those spaces? Who decides what counts as philosophical? It is not about answering questions and giving closure to our concerns as educators and researchers, but rather sharing with the readers how even in the least suspected place - an academic event about bringing philosophy to school - one might still not be listening to children. In returning to this self-questioning movement, we want to echo some of the troubling in the thinking and practices of listening in the so-called movement of Philosophy for/with Children: this for/with phenomenon, its politics and relations; some of the assumptions that might be present in the dilemmas in practice for educators and researchers; but also its aesthetics resonances, the sheer beauty of troubling, the (out of) tune of self-questioning, the questions it raises for us as researchers and the space of doubting and uncertainty it offers, like a hesitation or a breathing space. And perhaps, we wonder, it is in-between spaces, in its cracks and transitions, that important things can find their way into our thinking and conversations about childhood. Just like a piece of paper in a hotel room. (shrink)

The paper begins with the concept of voice and questions its different meanings, especially in educational settings, to propose a philosophical framing of people-of-young-age’s material voices. It then proposes to understand those voices as disruptive differences or opportunities to (re)think about our roles as educators and, most of all, to return to the question of what a philosophical approach to childhood might disrupt. In doing so, it outlines some ideas about “voice” as sound and materiality (Cavarero, 2005) and also about (...) “listening” as a permanent attention to what might emerge (Nancy, 2002; Davies, 2014), to then extend particular meanings of these concepts to the practice of thinking philosophically with people of different ages in the community of philosophical inquiry educational setting (Kennedy & Kennedy, 2012). It also builds on the concept of “event” by Gilles Deleuze (Deleuze, 2013), as a potential immanent within a confluence of forces, to then ask how we can foster a philosophical way of living (in) education that takes people-of-young-age’s material voices as something we cannot afford to lose. Finally, the paper proposes to frame the community of philosophical inquiry as a philosophical community of voices, in the sense of an opportunity to experience the materiality of all the voices as something that matters in the shared thought of its participants. (shrink)

This text was written after hearing a childlike question about voice, a question asked by Lara, a girl at a “basic” school in a rural area of the Azores islands that resulted in a diferent way of understanding the motives and intentions that are implicit in the way we practice community of philosphical inquiry with children and adults. This question also unveiled important aspects of the way we construct ourselves as adults who believe in the importance of teaching philosophy in (...) elementary school. This text describes an attempt to follow the trail of inquiry triggered by Lara’s question, and documents three moments or possibilities of re-questioning. These moments – which are not understood as forming an orderly sequence, but rather represent inroads into the initial question – emerge as possibilities marked by the rhythm of inquiry that followed. Those questions were: What do we hear when we talk about voice? What do we say when we talk about listening? And what do we think about when we share voices and listen actively? The text invites us to focus on voice as a concept aligned with a certain paradigmatic model of thinking commonly referred to as “philosophy,”and also invites us to consider the concept of listening as a construct that returns us to the origins of western philosophy. Finally, the text invites us to consider different ways of understanding voice and listening as based on the idea of thinking as an in-between space of sharing, focusing specifically on activities centering philosophical dialogue with children. (shrink)

The expression “end of nature” has been coined by American environ-mentalist Bill McKibben is his 1989 famous book, The End of Nature. Since then, the philosophical implications of such an obituary have been explored, mainly on an ethical perspective over the environment. The conceptual end of nature is one of those implications, in the context of a post-naturalistic environmental philosophy. Our purpose is to build upon the ambiguities of “nature” and reframe some readings of the concept of “integrity” as a (...) guiding principle in the relation between human beings and the environment. (shrink)

The main goal of Henri Bergson’s philosophy of nature is to offer a dynamic understanding of living phenomena. It is in this context that we main­tain that the author left us a “bio-philosophy,” that is, an interpretation which, by adopting a positive model of biology as a cognitive paradigm, describes the essential character of living activity as time or duration (durée). Bergson’s posi­tive metaphysics, which brings science to the metaphysical field and provides an inner perspective of the vital principle, consolidated (...) itself in the study of evolutionary theories like Darwinism. However, the specificity of the perspective Bergson presents to us lies in the fact that he positions himself as a philosopher and not as a scientist: he does not seek a merely scientific explanation of reality, but an integral vision that allows us to give scientific evolution a metaphysical reading. Thus, when Bergson upholds the insufficiency of pure Darwinism, and proposes a true evolutionism, it is because he thinks that the only way to understand the evolutionary nature of life is by overcoming a strictly mechanistic perspective. For Bergson, such an interpretation results from the artificial way in which our intellectual functions deconstruct reality and lead to an incomplete and fragmented reading of the evolution of organisms. As a philosopher he seeks an explanatory level which, being scientifically based, is not restricted to the physico-chemical limits of reality. For that reason, Bergson claims that the inner cause of evolution is an activity where growth and division occur as a natural result of the divergence of life’s tendencies. (shrink)

Gert Biesta claims that education involves introducing young people to a pathway from what they want to what it is good for them to want, offering the conditions for children to cross from the former to the latter. This shift from a realm of individual desires to the realm of the desirable constitutes a “de-centered existence”. Since there is an undeniable normative dimension in this view, it seemed important to search for the guiding values or principles that frames it. In (...) his ICPIC talk, G. Biesta refers to the Levinasian concept of responsibility, identifying individual desires (children’s desires) with the egological way of existence. In his 2014’s book, The beautiful risk of education, Biesta mentions the concept of educational wisdom (educators’ wisdom), through an Aristotelian standpoint. In either perspective, the author grants normative privileges to adults, claiming that, in an educational environment, adults have the responsibility to be educators and not learners. We follow from here to question Biesta’s statement of education as a risk, since if there are evaluative standards according to which educators can orient their practices, as well as students behaviors (either the responsibility in face of the Other or the ability to make good and wise judgments), how can one still talk about a risk in education? We end up our commentary by looking for deeper meanings for the concept of risk in education. (shrink)

The present text is a childlike exercise in writing. In responding to an invitation to write an adult, academic text, we the authors found that the presence of a child's standpoint acted to change the expressions that were to be elucidated, and that the project that adult writing represents was suspended by the creative force of childhood. "Philosophy for children" became "children for philosophy"; "moral education" became "the end (of) morality" and "conceptions of childhood" became the "childhood of conceptions." As (...) such our text is divided into different sections, in each of which we explore the implications of allowing ourselves to be transformed in our practice by recognition of the child’s voice; the problematization of conventional educational programmatics for one, and the opening of new pedagogical pathways, which recognize childhood as a moving force of thinking, as opposed to an object of study and manipulation. To this end, we engage several interlocutors from different fields--literature, philosophy, education, "philosophy for children", and from chronological children themselves. We conclude by proposing, based on an encounter with the work of H. Cisoux and J. Derrida, that we think about the relations between deconstruction and childhood in such a way that our affirmation of childhood leads to a transformation of the text itself—not only in its content but in its form. As such, we present the reader with a fundamentally childlike text. (shrink)